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ABSTRACT
Advocacy for the protection of animal welfare and women’s right to
reproductive choice have little, if anything, in common. It is productive, then,
to question the recurring association of these unrelated ethical issues. If one
feels compassion for the plight of the nonhuman animal, the argument goes,
then it is morally inconsistent to neglect the fetus. An understanding of the
incongruous political contexts at play between abortion and animal welfare
effectively repudiates this argument, but a more important question must be
answered: why is this strange argument so pervasive? In brief, it is the uniform
legal marginalization of women and animals that animates this false
comparison, which is instructively analyzed through the theoretical lens of
ecofeminism. The leading Canadian judgments of R v Morgentaler and R v
Ménard exemplify the socio-legal contours of ‘otherness’ outside the locus of
patriarchal dominance. This renders a broadly transferable framework of
oppression at the hands of the law; examining jurisprudential examples of
displacement of agency, fragmentation of the self, and instrumental
objectification, in both contexts, provides a useful starting point in a
consideration of the broad intersections between the legal treatment of women
and animals.
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The issues of abortion and the exploitation of nonhuman animals have little
in common, but share a pronounced ability to provoke heated, partisan debate.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, it follows that the two are often linked. Critics who
oppose a woman’s right to reproductive choice view the animal welfare stance as
a useful tool; if one cares about animal subjects, the argument goes, then perhaps
this moral consideration extends to the fetus. While this literature ignores
important differences and seeks to erode female bodily autonomy, it also
instructively demonstrates the law’s culpability in treating disadvantaged groups
in a way that masks their distinct identities. A nuanced analysis of the law
surrounding women’s reproductive freedom and animal welfare reveals the
dominant patriarchal perspective from which the law proceeds. As a necessary
extension, this discussion puts the other—those outside the privileged
perspective—into stark relief.
The notion that both women and nonhuman animals reside in this periphery
is intuitive given the patriarchal character of our social and legal fabric; however,
a careful consideration of the values embodied in these controversial areas of
jurisprudence should take nothing for granted. While the law aims to homogenize
these groups, it is essential to both foreground their differences and understand
the legal workings of uniform ‘otherness.’ Although arguments that link the issues
of abortion and animal welfare are generally unpersuasive, they are particularly
instructive regarding the patriarchal oppressive impulse.
Simply put, the body of criticism advocating for moral consistency—that is,
parallel ethical concern for both fetuses and nonhuman animals—is unconcerned
with the animal welfare movement. Instead, pro-animal arguments are
misappropriated and misapplied in an effort to disguise the central role of the
pregnant woman in the abortion debate. Approaching the issue through the
critical lens of ecofeminism elucidates the mutually informing nature of
patriarchal domination directed at women and nonhuman animals. This
theoretical framework speaks from the margins of the legal system and
underscores instances where subjugation intersects; it is therefore a particularly
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useful tool for understanding the jurisprudential implications of likening
antiabortion and pro-animal stances.
The legal treatment of these two unrelated issues has a particular culpability
in the recurrence of these arguments because the law marginalizes both women
and nonhuman animals in the same ways. Accordingly, a brief consideration of
the background of each issue and a discussion of representative scholarship on
both sides is an important starting point of this legal complicity.
First, I summarize the relevant animal rights philosophies and consider these
arguments in the context of antiabortion rhetoric; a careful consideration of the
tenuous analogies advanced and the dissimilar thresholds of moral subjecthood
dispels the initial seductiveness of these arguments. Secondly, I bring into relief
the ongoing critical debate, drawing particularly on the work of Gary Francione
to refute sentience-based arguments and emphasize the unique political context
of pregnancy and abortion. Thirdly, I employ the ecofeminist lens to foreground
the patriarchal subjugating impulse at play in both contexts. Finally, in light of
this backdrop, the leading cases of R v Morgentaler1 and R v Ménard2 exemplify
these parallel tropes of domination; I unpack these arguments using theories of
intersectional oppression. Ultimately, the forced conflation of the two issues can
be traced to the law’s uniform oppressive impulse, which fragments, objectifies,
and withholds agency in broadly similar ways.3

In order to understand the arguments supporting the conflation of
antiabortion and animal welfare positions, it is useful to outline the primary moral
theories at play. While this is a broad, diverse field of inquiry—and one that,
generally speaking, exceeds the scope of this paper—Peter Singer and Tom Regan

R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, 44 DLR (4th) 385 [Morgentaler].
R v Ménard, [1978] JQ No 187, 4 CR (3d) 333 [Ménard].
3 For the sake of simplicity, in this paper I sometimes use the term “animal” to refer to nonhuman animals.
Likewise, while it is technically reserved for the second trimester and onward, I use the term “fetus” to
describe an unborn human at any stage of development.
1
2
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are frequently invoked in these debates and therefore provide a useful starting
point for this discussion.

In his famous text, Animal Liberation, Singer makes a significant observation:
“Equality is a moral idea, not an assertion of fact.”4 Although this point may seem
intuitive, it has important implications for animal rights discourse. Instead of
looking to a being’s capacity to exercise familiar rights—for instance, the right to
vote or the right to free speech—this approach emphasizes a question first
articulated by Jeremy Bentham: “Can they suffer?”5 Singer identifies the ability to
enjoy and suffer as prerequisites for having interests that should be morally
recognized.6 He argues that, short of speciesism, needless pain inflicted on a baby
or an animal is equally immoral.7 By advocating for a low threshold of
subjecthood, Singer proposes a broad scope of ethical consideration, which those
looking to privilege fetal rights over those of the pregnant woman have
exploited.8 At this level of generality, this argument appears conducive to an
antiabortion sentiment; however, as discussed below, Singer’s philosophy
contains important qualifications that effectively remove it from this context.
The other major perspective that forms the background of this inquiry is
Regan’s notion of ‘subjects-of-a-life.’ Regan’s theory accords this status to those
with the capacity to experience pleasure and pain and form preferences; they must
have a sense of the future, both generally and in the context of desire, and be
capable of remembering their past and forming a psychophysical identity.9 The
significance of this idea for animal welfare proponents is concisely stated by Julian
Franklin in Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy.10 He suggests that Regan’s ‘harm
Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, revised ed (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) at 4 [Singer].
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York: Hafner Publication
Company, 1948) at 311.
6 Singer, supra note 4 at 4.
7 Speciesism is the idea that humans, by virtue only of our species, are entitled to greater moral rights than
nonhuman animals.
8 Singer, supra note 4 at 15.
9 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Oakland: University of California Press, 1983) at 243.
10 Julian H Franklin, Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
4
5
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principle’ is based on the idea that inflicting pain without a justifiable reason is
immoral. Franklin then goes on to observe the extension of the harm principle
to nonhuman animals; Regan demonstrates the capacity of developed mammals
to suffer and argues that it must, then, be wrong to inflict needless suffering on
them.11 Ultimately, Regan advocates for the inherent worth of each individual,
since “it has a life that is ‘its own.’”12 While this may appear conducive to a profetal life stance, subjects-of-a-life are nevertheless defined by certain important
criteria they possess, not by mere ontology. Given these clear distinctions, it is
worth pausing to consider the prevalence of this comparison.

The preponderance of arguments linking animal rights and antiabortion
stances is not coincidental. At varying degrees of distortion, both Singer’s
utilitarianism and Regan’s ‘subjects-of-a-life’ doctrine suggest far-reaching ethical
concern for vulnerable individuals. Given that these ideas are at the forefront of
animal defense scholarship, it is unsurprising that their potential implications for
the issue of abortion have been discussed.
Notably, and often omitted by those who employ his ethics to argue against
reproductive choice, Singer explicitly discusses the implications of his work in the
context of the abortion debate. His conclusion is in fundamental opposition to
the arguments conflating antiabortion and pro-animal positions. He writes: “the
life of a fetus (and even more plainly, of an embryo) is of no greater value than
the life of a nonhuman animal at a similar level of rationality, self-consciousness,
awareness, capacity to feel, etc., and since no fetus is a person no fetus has the
same claim to life as a person.”13 Signer does not advocate for the extension of
animal welfare compassion to the fetus; rather, he holds that the moral culpability
of terminating a pregnancy relates directly to the fetal capacity to suffer and
enjoy—that is, to have interests.

Ibid at 15-16.
Ibid at 17.
13 Ibid at 15-16.
11
12
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Grace Kao best summarizes the problem; she states that “[a]nimal pain is
arguably comparable to fetal pain in that we can only reason about either by
analogy.”14 This process gives rise to a line-drawing exercise between sentient and
nonsentient beings, which has led some to conclude that the “fate of fetuses and
animals must either stand or fall together.”15 Champions of this position argue
that “[a]t the level of substantive moral argument, both pro-life and animal rights
positions are characterized by their appeal to a priori, absolutist categories as
constituting the necessary limit to our power over others.”16 While this
perspective effectively ignores the fact that ‘absolutist categories’ can—and, in
this case, do—have different threshold content, it serves as a reminder that proanimal arguments are easily appropriated and reductively applied by those wishing
to promote fetal rights. The distinction between abortion and animal welfare
must, then, rest on something more than a utilitarian analysis of a fetus or a
nonhuman animal.

Despite these dissimilarities, critics who conflate animal defense and
antiabortion positions frame the comparison around the assistance of the
dependent and the vulnerable.17 This claim, however, is not universally accepted;
many scholars reject the ‘homological’ view—one that purports to identify
parallels between pro-fetal life and animal rights theories—and Gary Francione
is its most explicit opponent. In spite of his work dismantling this position,
antiabortionists continue to draw connections between these false friends. As
recently as 2015, Cheryl Abbate published an article intended to directly rebut
Francione’s piece from 20 years earlier.18 Still, her critique fails to engage with the
substance of Francione’s arguments and seems to misunderstand his key points.

Grace Kao, “Consistency in Ecofeminist Ethics” (2006) 3:11 Intl J Humanities 11 at 13 [Kao].
Ibid.
16 Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, “The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology and Abortion” (1991) 25:4
Ga LRev 923 at 944 [Mensch & Freeman].
17 Cheryl E Abbate, “Adventures in Moral Consistency: How to Develop an Abortion Ethic through an
Animal Rights Framework” (2015) 18 Ethic Theory Moral Prac 145 at 146 [Abbate].
18 Ibid.
14
15
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Are abortion and animal rights really comparable issues? Francione, an
American legal scholar, addressed this question in 1995.19 In response to
contemporaneous debate in moral philosophy, his essay in Animals & Women was
an effort to untangle these two “terribly complicated” legal and social issues.
Francione directed his article as much to the pro-choice feminists who felt
betrayed by animal rights discourse as to the antiabortionists making the ‘moral
consistency’ argument that provoked this entanglement.20 Refuting the idea that
support for animal rights is “one step down the road toward recognition of fetal
rights,”21 Francione engages with the question of sentience, but his analysis does
not begin and end there; for him, determining the proper moral outcome requires
an appreciation of the distinct political contexts at play.22

A focus on sentience alone, according to Francione, can lead to the
erroneous conclusion that approval of Singer’s views mandates the inclusion of
human fetuses in the utilitarian calculus.23 Antiabortion rhetoric presents
sentience as an all-or-nothing proposition; accordingly, the interests of the
nominally sentient fetus would require ethical consideration. Proponents of the
moral consistency doctrine therefore fixate on this aspect of modern animal
protection discourse to establish links to pro-fetal life arguments.24 Francione
advances the view that, while sentience is morally significant, it cannot be
determinative of the relationship between pro-animal arguments and the abortion
issue.

Gary Francione, “Abortion and Animal Rights: Are They Comparable Issues?” in Carol J Adams &
Josephine Donovan, eds, Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1995) 149 [Francione].
20 See, e.g., Mensch & Freeman, supra note 16; Jeff McMahan, "Infanticide and Moral Consistency” (2013)
39:5 J Medical Ethics 273.
21 Francione, supra note 19 at 149.
22 Ibid at 154.
23 Ibid at 153.
24 Abbate, supra note 17 at 147.
19
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To begin with, the significance of sentience in animal rights theory—along
with its fundamental definition—varies from scholar to scholar. Francione notes
that “rights advocates do not regard sentience as playing the same theoretical
role.”25 The Bentham/Singer utilitarian position turns largely on the weight
afforded to sentience, but for philosopher Tom Regan, for example, it is simply
the starting point in establishing moral consideration. Regan’s theory further
requires that a being “must have a psychological status sufficiently complex so
that we may say that the being has preferences, fears, hopes, mood changes,
etc.”26 As a result, sentience cannot be invoked to draw connections between
antiabortion arguments and animal protection theory generally.
Moreover, Francione argues that if the utilitarian position is taken to be
representative of all pro-animal arguments, human fetuses in the first trimester
are nevertheless unlikely to be included in this calculus. Fetuses at later stages of
development have displayed signs of sentience; however, the majority of
nontherapeutic abortions are performed in the first trimester, during which
period “there is substantial evidence that there is little, if any, sentience.”27 Even
if sentience were proved in first-trimester fetuses, it would be very difficult to
analogize to feelings experienced by a human or another animal. In any event, for
Francione, this complicated line-drawing exercise is irrelevant; abortion and
animal rights can—and should—be meaningfully distinguished on grounds other
than sentience.28

Despite its potential significance, other factors exist which are equally or
more important than sentience—namely, the divergent political contexts of
abortion and animal protection. The work of Singer and Regan can offer guidance
when one is “confronted with a conflict between two separate and independent
entities,” but the abortion problem represents a conflict between a woman and a

Francione, supra note 19 at 153.
Ibid at 153.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid at 150.
25
26
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being who depends upon and resides within her body.29 In other words, abortion
is a distinct moral issue.
The state’s role in each scenario informs the distinction between the two
issues. With respect to animal protection, the state can regulate, for example,
vivisection without impinging on the vivisector’s bodily autonomy but, naturally,
the same cannot be said for state regulation of abortion.30 Similarly, the
government’s regulation of vivisection, which Francione argues would be more
accurately likened to a scenario of child abuse than to abortion, does not violate
vivisectors’ basic privacy rights. Quite the opposite, Parliament cannot regulate
abortion “in the absence of a patriarchal intrusion of the law into a woman’s
body,” an encroachment on bodily autonomy not generally accepted anywhere
else in the law.31
An accurate representation of the abortion scenario requires recognition of
the pregnant woman’s unique role. In practical terms, the subject of this ‘debate’
is happening within her own body; she is, therefore, the only person in a position
to make important decisions about the situation. Francione explains that
utilitarian or deontological theories cannot be employed to obscure the fact that
the abortion question represents a conflict between a woman and a fetus, the
resolution of which presents only two possible alternatives. As he puts it, “one of
the two parties involved in the conflict may make the decision, and since it is
difficult for fetuses to make decisions, the woman is the only other available
decision maker.”32 Otherwise the decision would fall to the state.33
Allowing the state to decide the permissibility of abortions is an unjustifiable
interference with the pregnant woman’s decisional and bodily autonomy. As such,
it is futile to analyze the sentience of fetuses at different times during the
pregnancy and delineate a threshold for moral consideration. The evaluation of
fetal moral rights in isolation from the pregnant woman is inherently incomplete.

Ibid at 154.
Ibid at 150.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid at 156.
33 Ibid.
29
30
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Such an analysis is prejudicial toward a careful examination of the ethical
parameters of reproductive choice.

Cheryl Abbate, together with other critics, has called for animal advocates
to extend their animal protection ethic to recognize fetuses’ inherent worth. This
demand for so-called moral consistency is based on the idea that the animating
principles surrounding animal rights require a parallel approach to the abortion
question and that it is inconsistent to apply them selectively.34 Her reading of
animal rights theory culminates in the assertion that sentience is the “vital
characteristic” that gives rise to moral subjecthood.35 Abbate begins by assigning
sentience to at least some fetuses and then deviates from the plain meaning of
the word; she imports the ability to prefer and desire, which artificially expands
the scope of fetal interests. Under this definition, a sentient being has “equal
moral worth”; this subject is entitled to full, non-discriminatory consideration of
its interests. Or, in this context, the fetus has interests of equal ethical concern to
those of the pregnant woman.36
Abbate ostensibly aims her arguments directly at Francione’s 1995 article,
but she still chooses to focus almost exclusively on sentience, and she positions
Francione’s work as though it, too, turns on this concept. Her misunderstanding
may be the result of genuine confusion, but it is more likely a matter of
convenience; focusing on the sentience of the fetus allows it to become the centre
of the analysis, which in turn requires that the woman’s interests are only a
secondary consideration.

Abbate’s abortion analysis exaggerates the significance of sentience, distorts
crucial elements of Francione’s treatise, and omits discussion of other, more
important factors. Her analysis is therefore instructive for an understanding of
Abbate, supra note 17 at 145.
Ibid at 147.
36 Ibid at 149.
34
35
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how pro-animal arguments can be distorted and exploited toward a false assertion
against women’s choice. First, she identifies sentience as the crux of Francione’s
thesis; she claims that his philosophy designates sentience as the threshold
criterion for “membership into the moral community” as well as rightholder
status.37 Then, based on this foundational assumption, Abbate summarizes her
perception of Francione’s animal rights position in a two-step process:
1. If a being is sentient, then it is the bearer of prima facie rights,
including the prima facie right to life.
2. Certain animals are sentient. Therefore, certain animals are bearers
of rights, including the prima facie right to life.38

She proceeds to apply a moral consistency argument to the abortion issue:
Yet, if a sentience based animal rights theory is to remain morally
consistent, it is committed to using the same line of reasoning in order
to grant the right to life to sentient fetuses. Thus, Francione’s theory is
committed to the following argument: … certain (sentient) fetuses are
bearers of rights, including the prima facie right to life.39

While Abbate may be drawing on Francione’s actual scholarship with respect to
animal rights and sentience, her rebuttal does little to address the thrust of
Francione’s arguments: that sentience is all but irrelevant when the being in
question resides within another person’s body.

Abbate finds further common ground between pro-fetal life and –animal
ethics in the dependence on humans shared by fetuses and certain animals. She
posits that comparable instances of dependence arise when a woman carries a
pregnancy past eight weeks and when humans create or cause animals to rely on
them for protection and care. Considering these analogous relationships under
an animal protection framework—and ignoring the literal objectification of the
woman’s body that this presents—Abbate suggests that “a woman is morally
Ibid at 149.
Ibid.
39 Ibid at 150.
37
38
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responsible for assisting a sentient fetus when her voluntary acts or omissions
cause the fetus to be dependent and vulnerable.”40
In keeping with this line of reasoning, once a pregnancy has passed the eightweek mark, it follows that the woman ought to have known that she is pregnant.
At this stage, the woman and the fetus have formed a “morally significant
relationship” and the woman should not be permitted to abort.41 Further, Abbate
argues that a woman’s “voluntary omission” to abort before this stage in fetal
development grants the fetus “a special right … to use the woman’s body.”42 The
foregoing argument is in effect saying that, once this critical juncture in pregnancy
is reached, the rights of an eight-week-old fetus automatically trump those of the
pregnant woman.

Although Abbate’s allowance for abortions during the first eight weeks of
pregnancy may seem generous to some supporters of fetal rights, her analysis fails
nonetheless to give the pregnant woman due consideration. To be persuasive,
arguments in support of the homological perspective require the removal of the
woman’s competing interest in bodily autonomy. That is, the conflation of profetal and –animal rights positions is only possible by willfully ignoring the
importance of the pregnant woman, biologically and otherwise, to fetal
development.

Parsing the contours of Abbate’s argument is useful only to a point. The
main thrust of her paper rests on the artificial inflation of the role of sentience.
As an isolated incident, this article is a fairly commonplace example of reductive
argumentation. The more important inquiry asks about the pervasiveness of this
discourse. The conflation of this unlikely pair is not the product of random
choice; instead, the impulse to categorize the rights of women and nonhuman
40Ibid

at 146.
Ibid at 161.
42 Ibid.
41
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animals together is symptomatic of the patriarchal oppression that conceives of
the other as uniformly subordinate.
The oppressive impulse that underlies the subordination of women, among
other marginalized groups, applies equally to nonhuman animals. Indeed, the
predominant conception of nonhuman animals is an extension of the same
patriarchal ideology that has been and continues to be used to oppress women.43
Kao describes this as the “logic of domination.”44 This social construction allows
the marginalization of women and nonhuman animals to be mutually informing
and reinforcing. Kao notes the parallel rhetoric that feminizes nature and
dehumanizes women toward a uniform otherness. This “cultural-symbolic
association” reinforces the patriarchy as the exhaustive sphere of dominance.45
Against the norm of the rational actor under patriarchy—male, and as a
result, independent, reasonable, stoic, and in control of the natural world—
women and nonhuman animals are pigeonholed in the same category of inferior
other.46 While it is by no means the exclusive source of patriarchal authority, the
law has a specific and significant role in embedding dominant attitudes such as
these into our social fabric.

At the outset of this inquiry, it is useful to note the hostility that characterizes
the law’s relation to those at the margins. In his discussion of the opposition to
proposed changes to current anti-cruelty legislation, John Sorenson observes the
majoritarian distrust of animal welfare advocates. One Member of Parliament,
David Anderson, is particularly vocal on the subject, and his relevant comment is
worth reproducing at length:
We are in a situation now where animals will have more protection
than human beings. In particular I am thinking of fetuses in their
mother’s [sic] wombs. Research has consistently shown that fetuses
Sheri Ann Lucas, Should Feminists Be Vegetarians? A Feminist Defense of Ethical Vegetarianism (Kingston:
University Microfilms International, 2002) at 25 [Lucas].
44 Supra note 14 at 17.
45 Ibid.
46 Lucas, supra note 43.
43
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react to pain and that they pull away from it. There are a number of
videos that have been made showing the impact of them being torn
away from the womb and being destroyed … We are walking into a
situation where the government is willing to protect animal life at a
level that it certainly is not extending for human beings. What are we
coming to? We have some strange things happening in our country.47

This unprompted shift from animal protection to antiabortion rhetoric betrays
the function of this artificial relationship to those in positions of power. To
conform with patriarchal logic, any improvements to the laws protecting
nonhuman animals must happen together with the protection of fetuses. This is
not to suggest an interest in concurrent improvement for these historically
disadvantaged groups; rather, our related ideas of pregnant women and
nonhuman animals exemplify the unified impulse to dominate those outside the
centre of power. By failing to engage with the differences that exist within these
groups, the law is able to homogenize and ignore perspectives at the margins.

As Sorenson observes, “law is not the justice-based regulation of power but
a mask to conceal its workings.”48 It is therefore important to understand legal
discourse as both an instrument and reflection of power. Accordingly, when
considering the courts and other institutions of authority, a useful preliminary
inquiry asks: who gets to speak?49 Once the locus of authority is established, this
asymmetrical power relationship necessarily combines and homogenizes all
others outside the centre of power. As a result, the second inquiry—in other
words, who is spoken for? —reveals itself to be a far-reaching category that
crosses the boundaries of species. In this way, the ecofeminist preoccupation with
the intersections of oppression provides a useful tool for revealing the law’s
treatment of the other.
Marti Kheel helpfully summarizes the ecofeminist position: “Just as men,
under patriarchal society, view women as their antithesis in the quest for
John Sorenson, “‘Some Strange Things Happening in our Country’: Opposing Proposed Changes in AntiCruelty Laws in Canada” (2003) 12 Soc & Leg Stud 377 at 387.
48 Ibid at 378.
49 Ibid at 381.
47
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masculine self-identity, so too humans have often viewed animals as a foil for the
establishment of human identity.”50 Rather than degrade the status of women,
then, the juxtaposition of animals and women helps bring into relief the relations
of power that transcend gender and species.51 This comparison and the lens of
ecofeminism provide a meaningful rendering of the margins of society.

The critics who continue to conflate pro-animal and –fetal rights positions
are informed, at least in part, by a legal framework that marginalizes the other in
a consistent and generalized way. While they are in no way exhaustive, three
central concerns of ecofeminist thought elucidate some recurring motifs in the
law’s paternal relation with both women and nonhuman animals: displacement of
agency, fragmentation of the self, and instrumental objectification. In the
following analysis, I consider these three themes in relation to R v Morgentaler52
and R v Ménard,53 two of the leading judgments on their respective subject matters.
These decisions shed light on the law’s systematic backgrounding, devaluation,
and instrumentalization of the other that affect nonhuman animals and women
in parallel ways.54

An understanding of the Court’s decision in Morgentaler necessitates a careful
reading of the relevant Criminal Code provision, which is no longer of any force
or effect. Section 251 [now section 287] provides that
(1) Every one who, with intent to procure the miscarriage of a female
person, whether or not she is pregnant, uses any means for the purpose
Marti Kheel, Nature Ethics: An Ecofeminist Perspective (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008)
at 172.
51 Richard Twine, “Intersectional disgust? Animals and (eco)feminism” (2010) 20:3 Feminism & Psychology
397 at 400 [Twine].
52 Morgentaler, supra note 1.
53 Ménard, supra note 2.
54 Val Plumwood, “Conversations with Gaia” in Alison M Jaggar, ed, Living With Contradictions: Controversies in
Feminist Social Ethics (Colorado: Westview Press, 1994) 666 at 667.
50
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of carrying out his intention is guilty of an indictable offence and is
liable to imprisonment for life.
(2) Every female person who, being pregnant, with intent to procure
her own miscarriage, uses any means or permits any means to be used
for the purpose of carrying out her intention is guilty of an indictable
offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years.55

The fact that a third-party provider was subject to such pronounced
consequences, in contrast to the pregnant woman, is arguably symptomatic of the
law’s modest appraisal of female agency. Whether a woman chose an abortion
and allowed it to be procured by a physician or endeavoured to effect it herself,
her culpability appears virtually identical. This may have been relevant if this
provision was ever evaluated in light of decisional autonomy, but the most
important part of section 251 this analysis reads:
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to
(a) a qualified medical practitioner, other than a member of a
therapeutic abortion committee for any hospital, who in good
faith uses in an accredited or approved hospital any means
for the purpose of carrying out his intention to procure the
miscarriage of a female person, or
(b) a female person who, being pregnant, permits a qualified
medical practitioner to use in an accredited or approved
hospital any means for the purpose of carrying out her
intention to procure her own miscarriage, if, before the use
of those means, the therapeutic abortion committee for that
accredited or approved hospital, by a majority of the
members of the committee and at a meeting of the committee
at which the case of the female person has been reviewed,
(c) has by certificate in writing stated that in its opinion the
continuation of the pregnancy of the female person would or
would be likely to endanger her life or health, and
(d) has caused a copy of that certificate to be given to the
qualified medical practitioner.56

55
56

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 287(1) & (2).
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 287(4).
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These exemptions provided an onerous and ill-defined threshold for a pregnant
woman to meet if she wished to terminate the pregnancy and stay within the
bounds of the law. This section had both the intent and effect of limiting access
to reproductive healthcare, and formed the basis of the majority opinion in
Morgentaler.

R v Morgentaler is a Supreme Court of Canada decision from 1988. The case
concerned the constitutionality of section 251 of the Criminal Code, which forced
pregnant women seeking abortions to be approved by accredited hospitals’
“Therapeutic Abortion Committees.” Dr Henry Morgentaler, together with two
other physicians, established a non-accredited abortion clinic. Their aim was to
increase access to abortion for women who had not received official approval,
and to promote women’s right to reproductive freedom. The appellants raised a
number of different grounds of appeal, but section 7 of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms quickly emerged as the central issue.57
The Court ruled 5 to 2 that the offence could not be saved under section 1
of the Charter. However, the majority was split 2-2-1 on which part of section 7
was engaged, and only Wilson J, the Court’s lone female voice at the time, invokes
the right to liberty under section 7 of the Charter. While ostensibly a positive
outcome, the Court’s decision in Morgentaler represents a failure to meaningfully
interact with the gendered component of the abortion issue, and it ultimately does
little to support women’s decisional autonomy in matters respecting their own
bodies.

Notwithstanding the positive result in Morgentaler, critics were dismayed to
find that the decision still authorizes the displacement of a woman’s agency to a
third-party group—a committee of doctors who are, statistically speaking, likely

57

Morgentaler, supra note 1 at 31.
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to be predominantly male.58 The judgment of Dickson CJC privileges fetal
interests over those of the pregnant woman, and his reasons for striking down
section 251 turn solely on the undue delays it brought about:
State protection of foetal interests may well be deserving of
constitutional recognition under s. 1. Still, there can be no escape from
the fact that Parliament has failed to establish either a standard or a
procedure whereby any such interests might prevail over those of the
woman in a fair and non-arbitrary fashion.59

The Court, with the exception of Wilson J, sidesteps any consideration of the
effects the impugned process would have on a woman’s ability to make important
decisions about her own life.
Morgentaler, while certainly not the only instance of jurisprudential misogyny,
is an instructive example of the subtle ways in which the law fails to recognize
women as “competent moral actors.”60 By acknowledging that the underlying
purpose of section 251 may be saved if Parliament reconfigures the process
involved, Dickson CJC implicitly accepts that a woman may not be capable of
making a morally sound decision on her own. Carol Adams maintains, “women,
despite the overwhelming misogyny of moral theory that has posited them as
unable to make moral decisions, can and do make moral decisions quite
capably.”61 Still, inasmuch as it is legally permissible to reassign a woman’s
decisional rights to a person in authority, she can never truly have autonomy over
her own body.

Even the majority reasons in the Morgentaler decision betray a profound
disregard for the connection between the pregnant woman and the fetus; as a
subject, she is fragmented into pieces that do not reflect the reality of her
In 1995, nearly 75% of the physicians practicing in Canada were male. See Canadian Institute for Health
Information, Supply, Distribution and Migration of Canadian Physicians, 1999 (Ottawa: Southam Medical
Database, 2000) at 12.
59 Morgentaler, supra note 1 at 76.
60 Carol J Adams, Neither Man nor Beast (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1994) at 62
[Adams].
61 Ibid.
58
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experience. Beetz J, perhaps for analytical clarity, explicitly divides the
hypothetical pregnant woman into the fetus, as an individual, and the female body
in which it is growing. He goes so far as to say that the “protection of the life and
health of the pregnant woman is an ancillary objective.”62 Likewise, Dickson CJC
describes the protection of fetal interests as “a valid government objective” to be
balanced with the interests of women in their lives and health.63 This approach
illustrates what Barbara Ehrenreich describes as “the misleading way we are told
to visualize the fetus: as a sort of larval angel, suspended against a neutral
background.”64
Conceptualizing the rights of the woman and the fetus as anything less than
inextricably linked not only undermines the pregnant woman’s bodily autonomy,
but perpetuates a false notion of woman and fetus as analytically separable.65
Consequently, it is misleading to discuss the issue of abortion as though the
development of the fetus can occur independently of the woman’s biological
support.66 When the law positions the woman and the fetus as in conflict, the
actual subject affected by the impugned law in Morgentaler, the pregnant woman,
is divided into imaginary sections; there is no “hard-and-fast boundary” there,
and this process only serves to facilitate her objectification.67

The majority in Morgentaler agrees that the impugned offence trespassed on
women’s section 7 rights, but the justices penning majority reasons divided on
exactly which of the enumerated rights was violated; only Wilson J would dispose
of the case under the right to liberty, while the others opt to focus exclusively on
security of the person. The male justices’ arguments may seem strange, but their
reasoning is as clear as it is alarming: state intervention is sometimes necessary to
Morgentaler, supra note 1 at 82.
Kerri A Froc, “The Past, Present and Future of Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms:
Marking the 25th Anniversary of Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486” (2011) 42 Ottawa L Rev
411 at para 13.
64 Adams, supra note 60 at 58.
65 Diana Majury, “The Charter, Equality Rights, and Women: Equivocation and Celebration” (2002) 40:3
Osgoode Hall LJ 297 at 319 [Majury].
66 Adams, supra note 60 at 58.
67 Ariel Salleh, Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature, Marx, and the Postmodern (New York: St Martins Press, 1997) at 39.
62
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prevent a woman from ‘selfishly’ terminating a pregnancy.68 They have
determined that, absent medical risk or another unjustifiable physical harm, a
pregnant woman ought to proceed with a pregnancy, in accordance with fetal—
and societal—interests.
Wilson J’s decision is not only unique in its treatment of the relevant law,
but also in the language she uses; while the others assign the woman a passive
role in the abortion context— “perform abortions upon women,”69 “protected from
interference by others,” etc.—she sees the hypothetical woman as the most
important actor, the main character, a whole person.70 Wilson J’s reasons may
also shed some light on the operative logic in her male counterparts’ judgments.
She refutes the notion that this is a purely practical and medical decision; rather,
the pregnant woman’s decision is informed by her self-perception and perceived
relationship to society as a whole. In arguably one of the strongest instances of
jurisprudential feminism, Wilson J writes:
It is probably impossible for a man to respond, even imaginatively, to
such a dilemma, not just because it is outside the realm of his personal
experience (although this is of course the case) but because he can
relate to it only by objectifying it, thereby eliminating the subjective
elements of the female psyche which are at the heart of the dilemma. 71

By overlooking the more apposite right to liberty in favour of security of the
person, Dickson CJC and Beetz J reinforce the idea that women should
sometimes be compelled to sustain pregnancies they do not want. They isolate
her reproductive capacity from her lived experience and, in doing so, they
ontologize women as “usable.”72
Where Wilson J locates a Charter violation in the “female psyche,” the
majority further objectifies the pregnant woman by excluding the sphere of
reason or decisional autonomy from her section 7 protection. For Dickson CJC,
the infringement is exclusively a “physical” and “emotional” interference with her

Morgentaler, supra note 1 at 74.
Ibid at 31 [emphasis mine].
70 Ibid at 53 [emphasis mine].
71 Morgentaler, supra note 1 at 171.
72 Adams, supra note 60 at 69.
68
69
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bodily integrity,73 implicitly invoking the historical perception of women in
contrast with the ‘reasonable man.’ The separation of physical or psychological
processes from the more abstract concepts of liberty or decisional autonomy
requires a reductive, objectifying analysis. As Kaposy and Downie observe, this
reasoning embodies a “harm-based rather than a choice-based analysis.”74 The
counterintuitive choice, then, to focus on the right to security of the person in
the context of the abortion debate becomes inevitable under the majority
rendering of women as physical and emotional—but never thinking or aspiring—
holders of rights.

Just as the Morgentaler decision turned on the Code provision criminalizing
abortion, the jurisprudence on animal welfare is largely framed in relation to the
criminal prohibition on inflicting unnecessary suffering. It is therefore important
to examine the provision that criminalizes this behaviour before considering how
its interpretation demonstrates the tropes of oppression discussed above, albeit
in a different context. Section 402(1)(a) [now section 445.1(1)(a)] provides that
(1) Every one commits an offence who
(a) wilfully causes or, being the owner, wilfully permits to be
caused unnecessary pain, suffering or injury to an animal or
bird.75

Much, then, turns on the judicial interpretation of “unnecessary.”76 Necessity
connotes different meanings depending on the legal context, but perhaps never
strays so far from its plain meaning as it does in the context of nonhuman animals.
As the following decision demonstrates, the judges approach the necessity of
suffering from a decidedly anthropocentric perspective.

Morgentaler, supra note 1 at 57.
Chris Kaposy & Jocelyn Downie, “Judicial Reasoning About Pregnancy and Choice” (2008) 16 Health LJ
281 at para 20.
75 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 445.1(1)(a).
76 The text also clearly mandates willfulness as an element of the offence; however, this additional prerequisite
is outside the scope of this discussion.
73
74
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R v Ménard is a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal from 1978.77 The
case concerned the interpretation of “necessity” as it related to animals’ pain and
suffering under section 402(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. The accused ran a business
where he killed stray and unclaimed animals through the administration of carbon
monoxide, and the question to be decided was whether his system caused more
pain and suffering than was necessary.
Justice Lamer, then sitting on the Court of Appeal, wrote the majority
judgment of what remains a leading case on anti-cruelty offences.78 Much like in
Morgentaler, the result in Ménard is positive overall, but the rationale animating the
decision is less progressive than supporters of animal rights may have hoped.
Lamer J describes a hierarchy in which nonhuman animals are naturally inferior
to ‘man,’ and thus, responsibility for their wellbeing extends only so far as it is
still “in the interests of man.”79 Ultimately, the promising outcome of Ménard is
not enough to overcome the deeply problematic line of reasoning that led there.

Examples of the displacement of nonhuman animals’ agency and bodily
autonomy to human decision-makers can be found everywhere. Ménard, while
encouraging in result, is no different. According to Ménard, it is for Parliament to
decide what degree of pain can and should be tolerated by nonhuman animals.
Lamer J holds that the plain meaning of cruelty has no place in the relevant
Criminal Code provision; that is, inflicting pain— “even if extreme pain”—is
insufficient to satisfy the elements of the offence.80 Ultimately, conviction turns
on whether the pain is necessary to achieve human ends. Even if the animal is
demonstrating signs of distress or intense pain, this, in itself, is not an indicator
that the treatment is excessive or that it should not be accepted. The experience
While this is obviously not the most recent decision regarding cruelty to animals, Ménard remains, as Lesli
Bisgould observes, the classical statement of the “old hierarchy” separating the human and nonhuman
(Lesli Bisgould, Animals and the Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at 64).
78 Maneesha Deckha, “Initiating a Non-Anthropocentric Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law and Animal
Vulnerability Under a Property Paradigm” (2013) 50:4 Alta L Rev 783 at para 58.
79 Ménard, supra note 2 at para 46.
80 Ibid.
77

Vol. 25

129

of nonhuman animals has little, if anything, to do with how the law conceptualizes
their comfort and wellbeing.
Here, the perceived importance of the activity in question dictates what is
undue pain and suffering for nonhumans. It goes without saying that this is a
human standard, which is defined and implemented by humans based entirely on
human experience. Maneesha Deckha writes, “the legislation at issue in Ménard
… subordinate[s] animal interests to those of legal persons and calibrate[s]
“unnecessary suffering” … according to cultural norms and relevant industry
standards about acceptable animal use.”81 Although the case appears initially to
forbid nonhuman animals’ suffering, in result it relies entirely on the judgment of
humans as to where to draw the line for ‘unnecessary suffering.’

Just as the definition of a nonhuman animal’s pain and suffering is informed
by human ends, so, too, is its identity. The animal subject is defined in relation to
the type of human use to which it is subject; in other words, the same species of
animal may be conceptualized differently depending on the human activity at
issue. Consider, for example, a rabbit: her character changes radically in the eyes
of the law when she is framed as a tool for experimentation as opposed to a
beloved household pet.
The law’s fragmentation of the animal subject is clearly illustrated in the
following passage from Lamer J’s judgment: “It is sometimes necessary to make
an animal suffer for its own good or again to save a human life.”82 He invokes
examples such as experimentation or vivisection for human benefit, practices
which of course cause suffering but do not engage criminal liability. While an
animal left without food or water for several days, to use Lamer J’s example, may
suffer less than the subjects of vivisection, this provision condemns only the
former because of the perceived utility of the activities in question. Accordingly,
when the courts are faced with the question of the animal subject—that is, what
is an animal? —it is answered simply by determining how it is being used. Lesli
81
82

Supra note 78 at para 58.
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Bisgould writes, “it is the person’s interest to be protected, whether instrumental
or emotional. Even [with pets], animals matter because and to the extent that they
matter to us.”83

The broad exceptions to the Code provision carved out in Ménard, and the
law’s treatment of nonhuman animals more generally, requires objectification to
the point of obscuration. Consider, for example, the “inevitably very painful”
experiments endorsed in this judgment: to conceive of test subjects as anything
other than unfeeling objects raises an ethical dilemma that is virtually absent in
our jurisprudence.84 Thus, Ménard is particularly instructive for what it says about
the apparent judicial notice of the legitimacy of anthropocentrism.
The result, as Andrew Brighten puts it, mandates that, “where a method
exists that is reasonably accessible and not cost-prohibitive, and that reduces
suffering to the minimum inevitable level, it will be criminal not to adopt that
method.”85 Significantly, this thesis has become a starting point for legal
considerations of nonhuman suffering, sometimes referred to as the “Ménard
analysis.”86 Therefore, while subsequent jurisprudence proceeds with the
assumption that some suffering is acceptable, the foundational nature of Ménard
necessitates some basis for this conclusion. In perhaps the most famous portion
of the judgment, Lamer J finds this basis in his reading of the great chain of being.
He explains:
[w]ithin the hierarchy of our planet the animal occupies a place which,
if it does not give rights to the animal, at least prompts us, being
animals who claim to be rational beings, to impose on ourselves
behaviour which will reflect in our relations with them those virtues
we seek to promote in our relations among humans. On the other
hand, the animal is inferior to man and takes its place within a hierarchy
which is the hierarchy of the animals, and above all is a part of nature
with all its “racial and natural” selections. The animal is subordinate to
Supra note 77 at 128.
Ménard, supra note 2 at para 47.
85 Andrew Brighten, “Aboriginal Peoples and the Welfare of Animal Persons: Dissolving the Bill C-10B
Conflict” (2011) 10:1 Indigenous LJ 39 at 47.
86 Ibid at 56.
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nature and to man.87 While this description of the natural order may
be offensive, it imposes coherence on the judgment; that is, the
precedent it sets flows logically from the starting presumption that
nonhuman animals are “subordinate to nature and to man.”

Ultimately, Ménard exemplifies the alarming degree of objectification that is
required to render our instrumental uses of nonhuman animals acceptable.

As illustrated in the foregoing examples, the law’s treatment of abortion and
animal protection consistently asks the wrong questions. These decisions forgo
consideration of the individual animal or woman in exchange for generalized
misogynistic and anthropocentric analysis. Her interests are supplanted by male
and human perspectives, a process which perpetuates the marginalization of the
woman and nonhuman animal as others. Adams aptly refers to animals and
women in this context as “absent referents.”88 She explains that the abortion
question can revolve around the fetus only when one strips away the context of
pregnant women’s lives. Likewise, animals can easily be put to use for humans
when one ignores the animal’s interest in life and comfort, among other things.
She goes on to say that, “in both cases, … the social part of the context, that
which experiences the consequences of decontextualizing— the pregnant woman
and the living, breathing rabbit—disappear.”89
Similarly, Susan Sherwin describes a process whereby pregnant women’s
interests “are either ignored altogether or are viewed as deficient in some crucial
respect and hence subject to coercion for the sake of their fetuses.”90 This
approach is apparent in the law’s handling of both abortion and animal welfare:
the subject as an individual is obscured and broken down such that her interests
may easily be glossed over, if not explicitly overridden.

Ménard, supra note 2 at para 49.
Supra note 60 at 58.
89 Ibid.
90 Susan Sherwin, “Abortion Through a Feminist Ethics Lens” in Alison M Jaggar, ed, Living with Contradictions:
Controversies in Feminist Social Ethics (Colorado: Westview Press, 1994) 314 at 318.
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As a whole, supporters of fetal rights are uninterested in advocating for
animals. While this may not hold for every individual—some people may
genuinely, if irrationally, believe that an ethic of caring that extends to living
animals should also cover human fetuses, and vice versa—it is likely true of most
of the antiabortionists invoking the discourse of animal protection to bolster their
arguments.91 The simplistic conflation of fetal and animal rights cannot withstand
scrutiny, despite its initial appeal. When it is deployed, it is rarely meant to be a
tool to generate interest in animal welfare; rather, pro-animal arguments are
misappropriated and misapplied in order to conceal the very central role of the
woman in the abortion debate.

Generally, antiabortionists believe that the abortion question turns on the
moral status of the fetus, and, once they eschew the interests of the pregnant
woman, they ground their analysis in an “all or nothing” approach. As Sherwin
notes, “[o]pponents of abortion have structured the debate so that it is necessary
to define the status of the fetus as either valued the same as other humans (and
hence entitled not to be killed) or as lacking in all value.”92 It has long been
established that, with respect to nonhuman animals, the demarcation of a clear
threshold for moral status is virtually impossible;93 even among animal advocates
there is no consensus. The application, then, of an antiabortionist’s absolute
stance on moral status to the question of animal rights would require that they
also categorically oppose the killing of any nonhuman animal. Curiously, chants

The most extreme example is found in the implicit link drawn by George Dunea in his brief parallel
discussions of abortion and the animal welfare movement, where he refers to animal rights as a “radical
fringe” (“Abortion and Animal Rights” (1990) 300:6731 British Medical J 1068 at 1068). More generally,
there is a significant body of overtly partisan antiabortion literature that invokes animal rights only to
bolster their arguments. For example, Matt Walsh suggests that only antiabortionists can legitimately
express anger when puppies are needlessly slaughtered before referring to them as “dead mutt[s]” (“‘ProChoicers’: Here’s Why You Cannot Support Abortion While Opposing Puppy Murder” (11 February
2014), Matt Walsh (blog), online: <www.themattwalshblog.com/2014/02/11/>.
92 Supra note 90 at 317.
93 Angus Taylor, “Philosophy and the Case for Animals” in Vaughan Black, Peter Sankoff & Katie Sykes, eds,
Canadian Perspectives on Animals and the Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015) 11 at 13.
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promoting vegetarianism do not feature very prominently in demonstrations
outside of abortion clinics.
A fundamental difference in the approach taken by animal advocates is in
their characterization of the human species. As Adams points out,
“[a]ntiabortionists absolutize each individual fetus” in support of the “glaringly
anthropocentric” presumption that every fetus should be born, while supporters
of animal welfare relativize the human species within nature.94 As a direct result,
animal defense also relativizes the importance of the human fetus; it is considered
in context rather than in isolation, taking into account the social and
environmental consequences its birth will have.95 Antiabortionists are not simply
uninterested in animal advocacy; they are wary of it and actively threatened by it.
Given insurmountable inconsistencies, likening the two positions requires the
misapplication of at least one.

Dualistic reasoning animates the all or nothing proposition embodied in the
pro-fetal life conception of moral personhood. More specifically, the arguments
advanced by Abbate create a false dichotomy, where each side is defined in
relation to the other. Under the antiabortion rubric, a fetus is alive and therefore
worthy of protection, in contrast to what is not alive or deserving of ethical
consideration. In his discussion of abortion, Singer explains this argument in
formal terms:
First premise: It is wrong to kill an innocent human being.
Second premise: A human fetus is an innocent human being.
Conclusion: It is wrong to kill a human fetus.96

For the purposes of this discussion, the second premise is particularly important.
The designation of “innocent human being” is clearly all or nothing, and the
Supra note 60 at 64.
Ibid at 65.
96 Supra note 4 at 138.
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implications are the same: if this criterion is met, life should be preserved,
presumably at all costs.
The simplicity of this argument breaks down when one considers the
subtleties of reproduction. As Ariel Salleh points out, “[t]he placenta is not a hardand-fast boundary, so a mother’s relation to the seed is a continuing biological
negotiation between self and other. The pleasure of suckling a child is a reciprocal
process, the very opposite of the 1/0 fracture.”97 Similarly, in the context of
animal rights, the discussion is necessarily more nuanced than the wholesale
abolition of the exploitation of nonhumans.98 The pervasive ‘line-drawing’
approach to the socio-legal conceptualization of the fetus and the nonhuman
animal leads to a form of reasoning that eschews the complexities that
differentiate the animal protection and abortion contexts. Interestingly, this
simplistic reasoning—or the ‘1/0 fracture’—rarely plays out favourably for
nonhuman animals in the legal context.

While fundamental differences separate abortion and animal protection,
arguments conflating the two will continue to recur so long as the law
conceptualizes them as uniformly other. This may also be important to
repudiating the patriarchy; identifying intersections of oppression reveals the
workings of patriarchal oppression. Adams asks:
[G]iven that the majority of animal defenders are women, does this not
in itself say something? Women understand what it means to be
deprived of freedom based on biological differences. We know that
Western culture has situated women on the boundary of what is fully
human, thus women have a very good reason to examine what our
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Naturally, there are differences of opinion within the animal welfare movement. Certainly, some do
advocate for the wholesale abolition of animal exploitation. This is not, however, the view espoused by
Peter Singer or Tom Regan, who simply mandate a contextual examination of the relationship between
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culture does to other animals, while being suspicious of its control of
women.99

As Twine explains, using an ecofeminist framework to examine the treatment of
women and nonhuman animals together does not result in the dehumanization
of women, but instead a more revealing look at the socio-legal conceptualization
of both.100 This is not an exhaustive analysis; rather, it is a consideration of the
broad similarities in the law’s treatment of women and nonhuman animals. As
demonstrated in Morgentaler and Ménard, both groups are deprived of their agency,
fragmented into ‘usable’ pieces and thus objectified. Despite the relatively positive
outcomes of the foregoing cases, the reasoning justifying the results nonetheless
perpetuates their marginalization. This, even more than if the cases had been
decided unfavourably, suggests that an awareness of the uniform impulse to
dominate is essential.
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